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The Content-Discrimination 
Principle and the Impact of  
Reed v. Town of Gilbert 
By David L. Hudson, Jr. † 
Abstract 
The content-discrimination principle remains the chief analytical 
tool used in First Amendment jurisprudence. Under this doctrine, laws 
are categorized as content-based or content-neutral. Content-based 
laws are subject to strict scrutiny and content-neutral ones are subject 
to intermediate scrutiny. 
The U.S. Supreme Court ratcheted up the content-discrimination 
principle in Reed v. Town of Gilbert. Previously, lower courts were 
divided on whether a law was content-based if the underlying purpose 
was not to engage in censorship or content-discrimination.  In Reed, 
however, the Court declared that the law’s purpose is not the central 
inquiry. It concluded that if a law draws facial distinctions based on 
speech then it is content-based. 
This Article examines the Court’s decision in Reed and then 
assesses how this doctrine intersects and interacts with two long–
standing and controversial doctrines in First Amendment law: (1) the 
commercial-speech doctrine; and (2) the secondary-effects doctrine. 
Under both of these doctrines, content-based laws involving commercial 
speech or adult-oriented, sexual expression are treated as content-
neutral. These doctrines are seemingly irreconcilable with Reed. 
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Introducing the Content-Discrimination Principle 
Perhaps the leading doctrinal concept in First Amendment free-
speech jurisprudence is the content-discrimination principle.1 It has 
been called “the central inquiry,”2 “a critically important aspect of First 
Amendment doctrine,”3 “central to contemporary free speech law,”4 
“fundamental to free speech doctrine,”5 a “keystone to [the] First 
Amendment,”6 “the touchstone of First Amendment law,”7 “the most 
pervasively employed doctrine in the jurisprudence of free expression,”8 
and the “Supreme Court’s closest approach to articulating a unified 
First Amendment doctrine.”9 
Justice Thurgood Marshall, often underappreciated for his First 
Amendment opinions,10 expressed the principle most eloquently when 
1. See Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First 
Amendment, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 615, 616 (1991) (calling the principle 
“one of the most important” in First Amendment law and a principle of 
“growing prominence”); Genevieve Lakier, Reed v Town of Gilbert, 
Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016 
Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 233 (describing the distinction between content-based 
and content-neutral laws as “one of the most important” in First Amend–
ment law); Ashutosh Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 Iowa 
L. Rev. 1427, 1428 (2017) (describing the content-discrimination principle 
as the “central tenet” of First Amendment free-speech jurisprudence). 
2. Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom 
of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 49, 49 (2000). 
3. Jay Alan Sekulow & Eric M. Zimmerman, Uncertainty Is the Only 
Certainty: A Five-Category Test to Clarify the Unsure Boundaries 
Between Content-Based and Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech, 65 
Emory L.J. 455, 456 (2015). 
4. R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: 
The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. Miami L. Rev. 333, 
333 (2006). 
5. Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and 
Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 595, 596 (2003).  
6. Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental 
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 443 (1996). 
7. Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 Va. L. Rev. 231, 
232 (2012) (noting that for forty years the content-discrimination 
principle has been a “touchstone” of First Amendment analysis). 
8. Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. 
& Mary L. Rev. 189, 189 (1983). 
9. Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 21 (1st ed. 1998). 
10. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Marshall: Eloquent First Amendment 
Defender, Freedom F. Inst. (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.freedomforum 
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he wrote in 1972: “[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that 
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, 
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”11 This statement was 
historic, as it represented the first time that the Court emphatically 
and explicitly emphasized the need for content neutrality.12 
Under this now-familiar scheme, laws are considered content-based 
or content-neutral. A content-based law treats speech or speakers 
differently because of the message or content of the speech.13 A content-
neutral law applies across the board and does not make such content 
distinctions.14 The designation is mightily important, as content-based 
laws are subject to strict scrutiny, while content-neutral laws are 
subject to intermediate scrutiny.15 The distinction is often outcome 
determinative in free-speech cases, as most content-based laws are 
struck down and most content-neutral laws are upheld.16 
The Court expanded the content-discrimination principle in a series 
of cases after Police Department v. Mosley.17 In the early 1980s, leading 
free-speech scholar Geoffrey Stone identified the principle as the Burger 
Court’s “foremost contribution to free expression analysis.”18 The 
 institute.org/2013/02/04/justice-marshall-eloquent-first-amendment-
defender/ [https://perma.cc/N3UC-84LY]; David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice 
Thurgood Marshall: Great Defender of First Amendment Free-Speech 
Rights for the Powerless, 2 How. Hum. & C.R. L. Rev. 167, 168–69 (2018). 
11. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). 
12. Williams, supra note 1, at 624 (“Despite some early indications of concern 
about content discrimination, the classic statement of the requirement of 
content neutrality did not appear until 1972. In Mosley, the Court clearly 
announced the first amendment’s antipathy for content discrimination 
and, less clearly, described what content discrimination meant.”) (footnotes 
omitted); Steven Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content 
Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Law, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill of 
Rts. J. 647, 650 (2002) (“Although the case attracted little notice at the 
time, Mosley’s doctrine of content neutrality has become the cornerstone 
of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
13. Lakier, supra note 1, at 233.  
14. Id. 
15. See Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax Everybody, 58 B.C. 
L. Rev. 66, 92 (2017). 
16. See Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content 
Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1347, 1351–52 (2006). 
17. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
18. Stone, supra note 8, at 189.  
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concern over content-discrimination is crucial, as the government may 
be seeking to favor some forms of speech over others, engage in thought 
control, or distort the marketplace of ideas.19 In 1992, the Court broad–
ened the content-discrimination principle’s scope by holding that the 
government could not make impermissible content distinctions in areas 
of expression traditionally not protected by the First Amendment, such 
as fighting words.20 In 1994, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor may not 
have given the content-discrimination principle a ringing endorsement, 
but she noted that “no better alternative has yet come to light.”21 
While the division between content-based and content-neutral 
seems easy to understand, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it is 
not always a simple task to apply the principle.22 Critics have charged 
that the Court has been inconsistent and arbitrary in its application of 
the content-discrimination principle.23 Others have criticized the Court 
for relying too much on the doctrine.24 Division developed in the lower 
courts over the application of the content-discrimination principle. 
Some courts applied the doctrine quite broadly to cover most facial 
distinctions on the basis of speech,25 while others focused more on the 
underlying purpose of the regulation.26 
The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the importance of the content-
discrimination principle in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, a case involving a 
challenge to an Arizona ordinance that made many distinctions between 
types of signs.27 The Court reasoned that a law can be content-based 
even if the government does not have an explicit purpose to favor 
19. See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
20. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377. 
21. Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 60 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
22. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
23. See Wright, supra note 4, at 335. 
24. See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 12, at 652 (“In my view, the time has come 
to reconsider the content neutrality doctrine. . . . Content neutrality . . . 
is an important element of free speech jurisprudence, but it should not be 
regarded as ‘the first principle of the First Amendment.’”) (quoting Hill 
v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 789 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)); John 
Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1103, 1106 (2005) (“To the 
extent that the First Amendment requires government to treat equally 
speech that it favors and disfavors, these circumstances are limited and 
are for more modest reasons than the overarching goal of government 
impartiality.”). 
25. Jacobs, supra note 5, at 605. 
26. Lakier, supra note 1, at 234.  
27. 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015). 
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certain speech or disfavor certain ideas.28 Some view the Court’s 
decision in Reed as a significant change, or as something that might 
cause a “sea change” in the law.29 A recent federal district court decision 
referred to it as a “watershed First Amendment case.”30 A leading legal 
journalist called Reed the “sleeper” case of the Court’s term and one 
that would have “far-reaching consequences.”31 
This Article addresses the impact of Reed v. Town of Gilbert in the 
lower courts. Part I provides an overview of the Court’s decision, 
including its several concurrences that seek to limit or take issue with 
the majority’s approach to content-discrimination. Part II addresses 
and assesses the decision’s impact in several areas, including cases 
involving political speech, the commercial-speech doctrine, and the 
secondary-effects doctrine. Finally, Part III comments on the future of 
the content-discrimination principle. 
I. Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015) 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded the importance of the 
content-discrimination principle in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.32 The case 
involved a challenge to an Arizona city’s sign ordinance that made 
distinctions between various types of signs, including ideological, poli–
tical, and temporary directional signs.33 Ideological signs were treated 
most favorably under the ordinance. They could be twenty feet in 
diameter and could be placed in any city-zoned area.34 Political signs 
could be sixteen feet wide on residential property and thirty-two feet 
wide on nonresidential property.35 Political signs also had durational 
limits; they could be placed only sixty days before an election and could 
28. Id. at 2227.  
29. See Anthony D. Lauriello, Note, Panhandling Regulation After Reed v. 
Town of Gilbert, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1105, 1106 (2016) (speaking of a 
“coming sea change” caused by Reed); Kolby P. Marchand, Free Speech 
and Signage After Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Signs of Change from the 
Bayou State, 44 S.U. L. Rev. 181, 182 (2017) (calling Reed’s impact a 
“significant change” to First Amendment law). 
30. Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 296 (D. Md. 2019). 
31. Adam Liptak, Court’s Free Speech Expansion Has Far-Reaching 
Consequences, N.Y. Times (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
 2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-speech-expansion-has-far-reaching-
consequences.html [https://perma.cc/45C5-FYSG]. 
32. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2224.  
33. Id. at 2224–26. 
34. Id. at 2224. 
35. Id. 
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stay up to fifteen days after.36 Meanwhile, temporary directional signs 
were subject to many more restrictions. There could be no more than 
four signs on a property, they could be placed only twelve hours before 
a qualifying event, and they had to be taken down no later than one 
hour after an event.37 
Clyde Reed, pastor of the Good News Church, wanted to post signs 
informing the public about church services, which were held at different 
locations.38 Reed argued that twelve hours in advance was not enough 
time to inform the public about each service (each church service was 
a qualifying event for a temporary directional sign). He claimed that he 
could not post the signs far enough in advance to be useful without 
running afoul of the ordinance’s enforcers.39 Ultimately, he sued in 
federal court.40 Both the federal district court and the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied injunctive relief and deemed the 
town’s sign ordinance to be content-neutral.41 The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that the ordinance did not consider the content of the signs’ 
messages and that there was no purpose to discriminate against 
speech.42 
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed that 
judgment; but it was not unanimous in its reasoning.43 In his majority 
opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas reasoned that laws are content-based 
on their face if they either draw distinctions based on the speaker’s 
message or define speech based on its function or purpose.44 He also 
noted that laws are content-based if the government adopts the law 
because of a disagreement with the speech’s message.45 He explained 
that “an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially content-
based law into one that is content neutral.”46 
Justice Thomas reasoned that the town’s sign ordinance was 
content-based on its face because it drew distinctions based on the 
36. Id. at 2224–25. 
37. Id. at 2225. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 2225–26.  
40. Id. at 2226. 
41. Id. 
42. Id.  
43. The Court delivered three concurring opinions. See id. at 2223. 
44. Id. at 2227. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 2228. 
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“communicative content of the sign.”47 He rejected the idea that the 
sign ordinance was content-neutral because town leaders did not adopt 
the ordinance based on disagreement with any message.48 According to 
Justice Thomas, the Ninth Circuit erred by skipping over a “crucial 
first step”: determining whether the ordinance was content-based on its 
face.49 He explained that courts must first determine whether a law is 
facially content-based or content-neutral before examining the justi–
fication or purpose behind the law.50 Thus, the first step of a Reed 
analysis is facially examining a statute, regulation, ordinance, or policy 
to determine if it is content-based. 
Justices Samuel Alito, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan authored 
concurring opinions.51 Justice Alito explained that the Court’s decision 
did not sound the death knell for all sign regulation.52 He specifically 
listed a series of types of laws that would pass muster after the Court’s 
decision, including ordinances regulating the size of signs, whether signs 
are lighted or unlighted, signs with fixed messages and electronic 
messages, and rules distinguishing between on-premise and off-premise 
signs.53 
Justice Breyer viewed current First Amendment jurisprudence as 
too focused on labels and favored using content-discrimination as a 
“rule of thumb” rather than what he called an “automatic ‘strict 
scrutiny’ trigger.”54 He warned that applying strict scrutiny to laws that 
draw content distinctions without any attempts at thought or idea 
control could lead to unnecessary “judicial management of ordinary 
government regulatory activity.”55 
Justice Kagan’s concurrence criticized the majority’s approach the 
most. She reasoned that courts apply strict scrutiny to content-based 
laws for two fundamental reasons: to preserve a pure “marketplace of 
ideas” that the government does not attempt to influence;56 and to 
ensure that the government does not regulate speech because it harbors 
47. Id. at 2227. 
48. Id.  
49. Id. at 2228. 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 2223. 
52. Id. at 2233–34 (Alito, J., concurring).  
53. Id. at 2233. 
54. Id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573 
U.S. 464, 476 (2014)). 
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“hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message.”57 She 
explained: “We can administer our content-regulation doctrine with a 
dose of common sense, so as to leave standing laws that in no way 
implicate its intended function.”58 She warned that the majority’s 
position might cause the Court to become “a veritable Supreme Board 
of Sign Review.”59 
II. Impact of the Reed Decision 
A. Political and Noncommercial Speech 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert has had the most indelible impact in cases 
that involve political speech and other forms of noncommercial speech.60 
For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
determined that a state’s anti-robocall statute that applied to both 
commercial and political messages was an impermissible content-based 
restriction on speech.61 The law prohibited robocalls made “‘for the 
purpose of making an unsolicited consumer telephone call’ or [that] are 
‘of a political nature, including, but not limited to, calls relating to 
political campaigns.’”62 The law permitted robocalls in three instances: 
(1) when the recipient expressly agreed to receive them; (2) when the 
calls were related to a pre-existing debt; or (3) when there was a pre-
existing business relationship.63 
The Fourth Circuit applied the content-discrimination principle as 
articulated in Reed and held that the law on its face made content 
distinctions.64 After all, the law applied to consumer and political 
messages but not others.65 Thus, the Fourth Circuit applied strict 
scrutiny.66 The appeals court assumed that protecting residential 
privacy was a compelling governmental interest but held that the law 
was not narrowly tailored because there were several less speech-
57. Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992)). 
58. Id. at 2238. 
59. Id. at 2239. 
60. See Free Speech Coal. v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 825 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(discussing Reed’s effect on a First Amendment analysis); Norton v. City 
of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015) (same); Duguid v. Facebook, 
Inc., 926 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019) (same). 
61. Cahaly v. LaRosa, 796 F.3d 399, 402 (4th Cir. 2015). 
62. Id. (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-446(A) (2014)).  
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 405. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. 
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restrictive alternatives, including “time-of-day limitations, mandatory 
disclosure of the caller’s identity, or do-not-call lists.”67 
The Reed decision likewise played a major role in a state high court 
striking down its state cyberbullying statute as a content-based 
regulation of speech.68 The law provided that “it shall be unlawful for 
any person to use a computer or computer network to . . . [p]ost or 
encourage others to post on the Internet private, personal, or sexual 
information pertaining to a minor.”69 
A lower court had determined that the law was content-neutral, 
because it mainly prohibited conduct instead of speech.70 The appeals 
court explained: “The Cyber-bullying Statute is not directed at 
prohibiting the communication of thoughts or ideas via the Internet. It 
prohibits the intentional and specific conduct of intimidating or 
tormenting a minor. This conduct falls outside the purview of the First 
Amendment.”71 Furthermore, the intermediate appellate court deter–
mined that any impact on speech was incidental rather than direct.72 
 The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, determining that 
the law was content-based.73 It primarily relied on Reed:  
Recently . . . in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, [the U.S. Supreme] 
Court clarified that several paths can lead to the conclusion that 
a speech restriction is content based and therefore subject to strict 
scrutiny. This determination can find support in the plain text of 
a statute, or the animating impulse behind it, or the lack of any 
plausible explanation besides distaste for the subject matter or 
message.74 
The North Carolina high court explained that the law was clearly 
content-based because it defined and criminalized speech based on its 
subject matter75: “The statute criminalizes some messages but not 
others, and makes it impossible to determine whether the accused has 
committed a crime without examining the content of his communi–
67. Id. 
68. State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 818 (N.C. 2016). 
69. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) (2017). 
70. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 816. 
71. State v. Bishop, 774 S.E.2d 337, 343 (N.C. App. 2015). 
72. Id. at 344. 
73. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 819.  
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
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cation.”76 Because the law was content-based, the court applied strict 
scrutiny.77 While the state had a compelling government interest in 
protecting minors, the state high court determined that the law was 
not narrowly tailored.78 The court was troubled by the fact that “the 
statute contains no requirement that the subject of an online posting 
suffer injury as a result, or even that he or she become aware of such a 
posting.”79 The court concluded that while the state had a laudable 
purpose, “North Carolina’s cyberbullying statute ‘create[s] a criminal 
prohibition of alarming breadth.’”80 
Reed also has had major influence in cases involving sign ordinances 
that—like the ordinance at issue in Reed itself—impact political speech. 
Take the example of Wagner v. City of Garfield Heights, a case 
involving an Ohio city’s sign ordinance that imposed size limitations on 
political yard signs.81 Under the ordinance, political signs were limited 
to six square feet, but other signs, such as religious and commercial 
signs, could be twice as large.82 The Sixth Circuit determined that the 
law was clearly content-based under Reed and also unconstitutional.83 
After all, political signs did not harm aesthetic appeal any more than a 
variety of other signs.84 
In another case, a federal district court in New York invalidated a 
village’s ordinance that required a permit for noncommercial signs but 
exempted many commercial signs from the permitting process.85 A 
woman challenged the ordinance after she was cited for posting several 
protest signs in her yard.86 The court noted that the law clearly was 
content-based since it treated protest signs less favorably than other 
signs.87 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 819–21.  
79. Id. at 820. 
80. Id. at 821 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010), 
superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 111-294, § 3(a), 124 Stat. 3178 (2010)) 
(alteration in original). 
81. 675 F. App’x 599, 601 (6th Cir. 2017). 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 607. 
84. Id. 
85. See Grieve v. Vill. of Perry, No. 15-CV-00365-RJA-JJM, 2016 WL 4491713, 
at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2016), adopted by No. 15-CV-365-A, 2016 WL 
4478683 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016). 
86. Id. at *1. 
87. Id. at *3. 
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Another federal district court in New York invalidated a town’s 
ordinance that imposed severe restrictions on temporary signs, in–
cluding political signs, but allowed many types of commercial signs.88 
The court reasoned that the law was content-based because it treated 
signs differently based on their communicative content.89 Because the 
law was content-based, the court applied strict scrutiny. The ordinance 
failed strict scrutiny because the town’s interests in aesthetics and 
traffic safety were substantial but not compelling.90 
The Fourth Circuit ruled that Norfolk’s sign code violated the First 
Amendment because it imposed size restrictions on many types of flags, 
but allowed exemptions for certain flags with political or religious 
content.91 The Fourth Circuit explained that, under Reed, the city’s 
ordinance was clearly content-based because “[t]he former sign code 
exempted governmental or religious flags and emblems, but applied to 
private and secular flags and emblems.”92 The decision was striking 
because before Reed the Fourth Circuit had reached the opposite 
conclusion after deeming the sign code content-neutral.93 Legal 
commentators warned that many cities and towns would need to amend 
their sign codes after Reed.94 Certainly, many cities have amended their 
sign codes in the wake of Reed, particularly those provisions that 
impose differential treatment between commercial and noncommercial 
speech.95 
Another area in which Reed has had a transformative impact is 
panhandling laws. In Reed’s aftermath, many panhandling ordinances 
have been invalidated or at least temporarily halted.96 Even when a 
panhandling ordinance is deemed content-neutral, it may not survive 
88. Marin v. Town of Southeast, 136 F. Supp. 3d 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
89. Id. at 567–68. 
90. Id. at 568–69. 
91. Cent. Radio Co. v. City of Norfolk, 811 F.3d 625, 634 (4th Cir. 2016). 
92. Id. at 633. 
93. See Cent. Radio Co. v. City of Norfolk, 776 F.3d 229, 241 (4th Cir. 2015). 
94. Brian J. Connolly & Alan C. Weinstein, Sign Regulation After Reed: 
Suggestions for Coping with Legal Uncertainty, 47 Urb. Law. 569, 610–
11 (2015). 
95. See Steve Butler, The Importance of Bringing Your Sign Code Up-to-
Date, Mun. Res. & Servs. Ctr. (Oct. 29, 2015), http://mrsc.org/Home/ 
 Stay-Informed/MRSC-Insight/October-2015/The-Importance-of-Your-Sign-
Code.aspx [https://perma.cc/2CP4-HVJM] (discussing Reed’s impact on 
local governments’ sign codes). 
96. See, e.g., R.I. Homeless Advocacy Project v. City of Cranston, C.A. No. 
17-334 S, 2017 WL 3327573, at *1 (D.R.I. Aug. 3, 2017) (enjoining an 
ordinance that effectively made it “too difficult to panhandle successfully”). 
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First Amendment review.97 One commentator writes that “the 
constitutionality of current panhandling laws is dubious after Reed.”98 
Perhaps the clearest example of Reed’s impact comes from litigation 
over the city of Springfield, Illinois’s panhandling ordinance.99 Before 
Reed, a divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit upheld the panhandling ordinance as content-neutral.100 
Writing for the panel, Judge Frank Easterbrook reasoned that laws are 
content-based when they discriminate against speech based on ideas or 
when the government passes the law to reflect disapproval of a certain 
message.101 “It is hard to see an anti-panhandling ordinance as entailing 
either kind of discrimination,” Easterbrook wrote.102 “‘Give me money 
right now’ does not express an idea or message about politics, the arts, 
or any other topic on which the government may seek to throttle 
expression in order to protect itself or a favored set of speakers.”103 
Judge Manion disagreed, finding the criminalization of panhandling 
“alien to our First Amendment jurisprudence.”104 He reasoned that the 
law clearly criminalized certain speech based on content, namely asking 
for money.105 To enforce the ordinance, police officers have to ascertain 
whether an individual asked for money, which was a violation, or merely 
asked for time or labor, which was not a violation.106 Manion accused 
the majority of confusing or conflating content-discrimination with 
viewpoint discrimination: “In its attempt to determine whether the 
ordinance is content-based, the court examines whether the ordinance 
strips a viewpoint from the marketplace of ideas. That is not the test 
for determining whether an ordinance is a content-based regulation of 
speech.”107 
The Seventh Circuit, however, had to re-address the ordinance’s 
constitutionality after Reed. Judge Easterbrook recognized that Reed 
had changed the game in that “Reed understands content-discrimin–
97. Petrello v. City of Manchester, No. 16–cv–008–LM, 2017 WL 3972477, at 
*10–11 (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2017). 
98. Lauriello, supra note 29, at 1107. 
99. Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2014). 
100. Id. at 717–18. 
101. Id. at 717. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 718 (Manion, J., dissenting). 
105. Id. at 721. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. at 722. 
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ation differently.”108 Easterbrook acknowledged that after Reed, “[a]ny 
law distinguishing one kind of speech from another by reference to its 
meaning now requires a compelling justification.”109 Thus, the Seventh 
Circuit reached a different conclusion after Reed and held that the 
ordinance was unconstitutional.110 Judge Manion once again concurred 
separately, writing that “Reed injected some much-needed clarity into 
First Amendment jurisprudence” by recognizing that “topical censor–
ship is still censorship.”111 
A federal district court in Massachusetts invalidated the city of 
Worchester’s ordinance dealing with “aggressive panhandling.”112 The 
court easily found the law to be content-based under Reed.113 Still 
another federal district court decision felled another panhandling ordin–
ance in Grand Junction, North Dakota.114 
The consensus appears to be that many panhandling ordinances do 
not survive a post-Reed analysis.115 As two legal commentators recently 
explained in 2019, “[w]ithout a doubt, Reed has changed the playing 
field for regulation of panhandling and solicitation, requiring that 
henceforth such regulation be content-neutral in order to survive 
judicial challenges.”116 
B.  Commercial-Speech Cases 
Reed’s impact diminishes in many cases that involve only 
commercial speech or advertising, a category of speech defined as speech 
that does no more than propose a commercial transaction117 or 
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and 
its audience.”118 The commercial-speech doctrine, which allows for 
greater restriction of the content of commercial speech, as opposed to 
108. Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2015). 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 412–13. 
111. Id. at 413 (Manion, J., concurring). 
112. Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 238 (D. Mass. 2015). 
113. Id. at 233. 
114. Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1294 (D. Colo. 
2015). 
115. See Judith Welch Wegner & Matthew Norchi, Regulating Panhandling: 
Reed and Beyond, 63 S.D. L. Rev. 579, 606–07 (2019). 
116. Id. at 606. 
117. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2001). 
118. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993) 
(quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)). 
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noncommercial speech, appears to conflict squarely with Reed’s central 
meaning.119 
In 1942, the Supreme Court declared that commercial speech had 
no First Amendment protection.120 The Court declared that “the 
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects 
purely commercial advertising.”121 This rule stood for several decades 
until the mid-1970s, when the Supreme Court overruled its 1942 
decision and declared that “the free flow of commercial information is 
indispensable” in a commercial culture.122 The Court explained that a 
“consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information . . . may 
be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most 
urgent political debate”123 and that “society also may have a strong 
interest in the free flow of commercial information.”124 While the Court 
explained that commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment 
protection, it did not create a specific legal test to determine whether 
laws impacting commercial speech were constitutional.125 
In First Amendment jurisprudence, commercial speech receives 
protection but it is still viewed as a stepchild in the First Amendment 
family.126 All regulations of commercial speech—both content-based and 
content-neutral—are evaluated under the so-called Central Hudson 
test, a variant of intermediate scrutiny developed by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in 1980.127 
Thus, commercial speech is treated less favorably than 
noncommercial speech. Content-based restrictions on noncommercial 
speech are subject to strict scrutiny, while content-based restrictions on 
119. See James Andrew Howard, Note, Salvaging Commercial Speech Doctrine: 
Reconciling Reed v. Town of Gilbert with Constitutional Free Speech 
Tradition, 27 Geo. Mason U. C.R.L.J. 239, 243–44 (2017) (“If Reed is 
to be taken on its face, then any separate distinctions for commercial 
speech must be implicitly overturned.”); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 
2016 Wis. L. Rev. 133, 180 (noting that Reed “signals growing tension 
between various First Amendment sub-doctrines”). 
120. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942). 
121. Id. 
122. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
748, 765 (1976). 
123. Id. at 763.  
124. Id. at 764. 
125. David L. Hudson, Jr., The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech 
§ 6.5, at 155 (1st ed. 2012). 
126. Rodney A. Smolla, The Puffery of Lawyers, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2002). 
127. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  
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commercial speech nearly always are evaluated under Central Hudson’s 
form of intermediate scrutiny.128 
The commercial-speech doctrine does not make much sense in a 
world dominated by advertising and consumer choice. In 1990, Judge 
Alex Kozinski and legal scholar Stuart Banner penned an incisive 
article, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech, in which they conclude 
that the commercial speech versus noncommercial speech distinction 
“makes no sense.”129 
And yet the Central Hudson test and its variant of intermediate 
scrutiny have proven surprisingly durable.130 Under Central Hudson, a 
government restriction on advertisements or other commercial speech 
is permissible only on a showing that: (1) the advertising is misleading, 
(2) the government interest in regulation is substantial, (3) the 
regulation directly advances that interest, and (4) the regulation is not 
more extensive than necessary.131 Justice Lewis Powell justified this 
lower level of protection for free speech because of the inherent 
“hardiness” of commercial speech.132 Another reason that supposedly 
justifies less free-speech protection for commercial speech is that 
advertising is more objectively verifiable.133 
But the notion that it is easier to determine or verify the truth of 
commercial speech is doubtful at best.134 Furthermore, the idea that 
commercial speech is more “durable” than other forms of speech—
because there are profit motivations behind it—is even shakier than the 
other justification. Kozinski and Banner explain that “the durability of 
speech is not purely a function of the economic interest behind it; other 
interests can be just as strong as economics, sometimes stronger.”135 
These scholars are far from alone.136 First Amendment expert Rodney 
128. See Hudson, Jr., supra note 125, § 6.1, at 140 (“For example, recall that 
a content-based restriction on political speech is subject to the highest 
form of judicial review, called strict scrutiny. However, content-based 
restrictions on commercial speech are subject to only intermediate 
scrutiny.”). 
129. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 
76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 627–28 (1990). 
130. Hudson, Jr., supra note 125, § 6.5, at 156. 
131. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. 
132. Id. at 564 n.6. 
133. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 129, at 634. 
134. Id. at 635. 
135. Id. at 637. 
136. See Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment: 
A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 Tex. L. Rev. 
777, 780 (1993).  
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Smolla declared that “[c]ommercial speech, as speech, should presump–
tively enter the debate with full First Amendment protection.”137 
Commercial speech, however, remains a second-class citizen in the 
First Amendment family. Justice Clarence Thomas has criticized the 
Central Hudson test as providing too little protection for commercial 
speech.138 He believes that bans on truthful, non-misleading speech 
should be evaluated under strict scrutiny just like bans on political 
speech.139 Recall that Justice Thomas also authored the Court’s opinion 
in Reed. Some have speculated that this means that the second-class 
treatment of commercial speech might be nearing its end.140 
To date, many courts continue to apply the Central Hudson test to 
regulations on commercial speech even after mentioning Reed.141 For 
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a city’s 
mobile billboard ordinance,142 which prohibited “mobile billboard ad–
vertising displays” (namely, billboards on moving vehicles).143 The 
ordinance prohibited only signs that advertise; accordingly, mobile 
billboard companies asserted that this made the ordinance content-
based.144 The Ninth Circuit, however, applied a broader meaning to the 
term “advertising signs,” taking it to mean any sign on a mobile 
billboard: “[M]obile billboard bans regulate the manner—not the 
content—of affected speech. The ordinances address only the types of 
sign-bearing vehicles subject to regulation, and discriminate against 
prohibited billboards on the basis of their size and mobility alone, and 
137. Id. 
138. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 521–22 (1996) (“I do 
not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that ‘commercial 
speech’ is of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ speech.”); see also David 
L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas: The Emergence of a 
Commercial Speech Protector, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 485, 497 (2002). 
139. Hudson, Jr., supra note 138, at 499. 
140. See Vugo, Inc. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 139, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 
2018) (noting that some have wondered about the fate of the commercial-
speech doctrine in light of Justice Thomas’s call for abandoning Central 
Hudson’s test and his authoring the Court’s opinion in Reed). 
141. Id. (“[T]he Court thus declines to stray from such well-established 
doctrine absent an express holding from either the Supreme Court or the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit”); Contest Promotions, LLC v. 
City of San Francisco, 704 F. App’x 665, 667–68, 667 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017) 
(noting that Reed does not alter the commercial-speech doctrine). 
142. Lone Star Sec. & Video Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 827 F.3d 1192, 1202 
(9th Cir. 2016).  
143. Id. at 1196. 
144. Id. at 1198–99. 
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are thus content neutral.”145 The Ninth Circuit specifically addressed 
and distinguished the mobile billboard ordinance from the ordinance 
invalidated in Reed.146 
Similarly, a federal district court in New Hampshire determined 
that a town’s denial of a permit to a church to post an electronic sign 
did not violate the First Amendment.147 The court reasoned that the 
town’s regulation of electronic signs was a permissible, content-neutral 
provision.148 The town asserted that the ban on electronic signs served 
its substantial interests in aesthetics and traffic safety.149 The judge 
wrote that electronic signs could be “garish” and could threaten the 
aesthetics of the small town.150 With regard to traffic safety, the judge 
simply deferred to town officials and wrote that he was not in a position 
to “second guess” them.151 
Not all courts ignore Reed when an ordinance involves only 
commercial speech. A federal district court in New Jersey struck down 
an Atlantic City ordinance prohibiting businesses from engaging in 
bring-your-own-beer-and-wine advertising.152 While the ordinance 
limited commercial speech, the court cited Reed and subjected the 
ordinance to strict scrutiny instead of the familiar Central Hudson 
test.153 The court wrote that the ordinance “provides a complete ban on 
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech about a lawful product.”154 
The court also held that, even if the Central Hudson test applies, the 
advertising ban fails intermediate scrutiny, too.155 
Many commentators have noted that Reed involved a specific 
challenge to a sign ordinance that involved differential treatment of 
commercial and noncommercial speakers.156 They point out that Reed 
145. Id. at 1200. 
146. Id. 
147. Signs for Jesus v. Town of Pembroke, 230 F. Supp. 3d. 49, 68–69 (D.N.H. 
2017). 
148. Id. at 63.  
149. Id. at 60–61. 
150. Id. at 61. 
151. Id. 
152. GJJM Enters. v. City of Atlantic City, 352 F. Supp. 3d 402, 408 (D.N.J. 
2018). 
153. Id. at 406. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 407. 
156. Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1981, 1981–82, 1987, 1991 (2016).  
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did not involve commercial speech.157 It is quite difficult, however, to 
square the commercial-speech doctrine with numerous statements in 
Reed, including the Court’s take on content-based laws: “Content-based 
laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—
are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the 
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling 
state interests.”158 This is also true with respect to Reed’s position that 
the “[g]overnment[’s] regulation of speech is content based if a law 
applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea 
or message expressed.”159 
C.  The Secondary-Effects Doctrine 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert’s emphasis on content-discrimination also 
appears to call into question the continued validity of the secondary-
effects doctrine, a disturbing legal fiction of sorts which allows for 
content-based restrictions on businesses conveying “adult” expression 
to be classified as content-neutral.160   
Under the secondary-effects doctrine, certain speech can be 
censored not because of its content’s “offensiveness” but because of 
some adverse side effect—a secondary effect—such as increased crime 
or decreased property values.161 The doctrine provides an easy path for 
government officials to censor expression because government officials 
can often come up with alleged secondary effects caused by speech.162 
One leading free-speech scholar has called the doctrine both 
“misleading” and “dangerous.”163 
In a dissenting opinion in an adult-business zoning case, Justice 
Potter Stewart warned that the secondary-effects doctrine “rides 
roughshod over cardinal principles of First Amendment law.”164 Despite 
157. Id. at 1990–91. 
158. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015). 
159. Id. at 2227. 
160. See David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: ‘The 
Evisceration of First Amendment Freedoms’, 37 Washburn L.J. 55, 60, 
73 (1997). 
161. See id. at 62. 
162. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: Stripping Away 
First Amendment Freedoms, 23 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 19, 19–20 (2012). 
163. John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 
291, 293 (2005). 
164. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 85–86 (1976) (Stewart, 
J., dissenting). 
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that warning, the doctrine has become the dominant analytical model 
used to justify myriad restrictions on adult businesses.165 
The U.S. Supreme Court developed the secondary-effects doctrine 
in a footnote166 to a 1976 case in which it upheld a Detroit Anti-Skid 
Row ordinance that imposed locational zoning requirements on adult 
businesses.167 The Court also emphasized that the case concerned a form 
of low-value speech:  
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not 
tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some 
arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest in 
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and 
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political 
debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal comment.168 
Ten years later, in Renton v. Playtime Theatres,169 the Court 
expanded the secondary-effects doctrine from a footnote into a major 
doctrinal principle.170 The Court upheld a Renton, Washington, 
ordinance that prohibited adult movie theaters from locating within one 
thousand feet of any residential area, church, park, or school.171 The 
Court reasoned that the ordinance was content-neutral because it was 
not designed to suppress offensive speech, but rather to combat harmful 
secondary effects associated with the expression.172 
165. See Hudson, Jr., supra note 162, at 19. 
166. See Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34; see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Famous 
Footnotes Step Up in Important First Amendment Cases, Freedom F. 
Inst. (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2015/ 
 04/13/famous-footnotes-step-up-in-important-first-amendment-cases 
[https://perma.cc/9UZ5-LCJK]. 
167. Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34 (plurality opinion) (“The Common Council’s 
determination was that a concentration of ‘adult’ movie theaters causes 
the area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime, effects which are not 
attributable to theaters showing other types of films. It is this secondary 
effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination 
of ‘offensive’ speech.”). 
168. Id. at 70; see also Evelyn Beatrice Hall, The Friends of Voltaire 
199 (1907) (the Voltaire comment referenced by the Court is: “I disapprove 
of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”). 
169. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).  
170. See id. at 49–52. 
171. Id. at 43. 
172. Id. at 47. 
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The Court later applied the secondary-effects doctrine in cases that 
involved regulating the form of nude performance dancing.173 Ironically, 
in the later of those two decisions, Justice John Paul Stevens—who 
wrote the Court’s initial secondary-effects decision in Young—
dissented, recognizing the impact of the Court expanding the doctrine 
beyond restrictions on adult businesses’ locations to direct restrictions 
on their expression.174 In another decision, the Court extended the 
secondary-effects doctrine to ban so-called multiple-use adult businesses 
even though they were under the same roof.175 
Some courts recognize the tension between the secondary-effects 
doctrine and Reed. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit put it bluntly: “There is no question that Reed has 
called into question the reasoning undergirding the secondary-effects 
doctrine.”176 The Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that the Supreme 
Court in Reed never mentioned the term “secondary effects” and, thus, 
the intermediate appellate court could not “read Reed as abrogating 
either the Supreme Court’s or this Circuit’s secondary-effects 
precedents.”177 
Several courts have cursorily dismissed the impact of Reed in adult-
business secondary effects cases. The Seventh Circuit briefly addressed 
the tension between Reed and the secondary-effects doctrine in a 
footnote in an adult business case.178 The appeals court questioned 
whether Reed should impact the law on sexually oriented businesses: 
“We don’t think Reed upends established doctrine for evaluating 
regulation of businesses that offer sexually explicit entertainment, a 
category the Court has said occupies the outer fringes of First 
173. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
174. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 317–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Until now, the 
‘secondary effects’ of commercial enterprises featuring indecent entertainment 
have justified only the regulation of their location. For the first time, the 
Court has now held that such effects may justify the total suppression of 
protected speech.”); see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Stevens, 
Justice Souter, and the Secondary Effects Doctrine, 35 UWLA L. Rev. 
48, 49 (2003) (explaining that both Justices John Paul Stevens and David 
Souter initially supported the secondary-effects doctrine but later dissented 
in secondary-effects cases). 
175. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 429–30 (2002). 
176. Flanigan’s Enters. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 703 F. App’x 929, 935 
(11th Cir. 2017). 
177. Id. 
178. See BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 326 n.1 (2015). 
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Amendment protection.”179 The Supreme Court of Georgia reached a 
similar conclusion—ironically, also in a footnote.180 
There is another trend developing in some courts’ recent decisions 
involving First Amendment challenges to adult entertainment reg–
ulations. These decisions note the tension between Reed and the 
secondary-effects doctrine, but still apply the doctrine.181 As one federal 
district court judge recently wrote, “Young and Renton remain good 
law. It is not for me to repudiate these decisions by ruling that the 
regulation of adult-oriented businesses amounts to content-based 
regulation and warrants the application of strict scrutiny.”182 
Reed had a significant impact on the Third Circuit’s examination 
of 18 U.S.C. § 2257,183 the Department of Justice’s recordkeeping 
provision that requires producers of sexually oriented materials to keep 
records to ensure that minors are not used in the production of the 
material.184 The law “requires producers of visual depictions of ‘actual 
sexually explicit conduct’ to keep ‘individually identifiable records’ 
documenting the identity and age of every performer appearing in those 
depictions.”185 There are also detailed regulations accompanying the law 
that impose further recordkeeping requirements on producers of 
sexually explicit material.186 
179. Id. 
180. Maxim Cabaret, Inc. v. Town of Sandy Springs, 816 S.E.2d 31, 36 n.4 
(Ga. 2018) (“But Reed did not involve secondary-effects legislation. Nor 
did the opinion in Reed mention, much less overrule, prior cases in which 
the Supreme Court specifically held that regulations designed to reduce 
the negative secondary effects of adult entertainment businesses are 
treated as content neutral and thus subject to an intermediate level of 
scrutiny.”). 
181. See, e.g., “Q”-Lungian Enters. v. Town of Windsor Locks, 272 F. Supp. 
3d 289, 296 (D. Conn. 2017) (applying the secondary-effects doctrine 
despite acknowledging tension created by Reed); 1407, LLC v. City of 
Fort Wayne, No. 1:18-CV-224-TLS, 2019 WL 341239, at *4 (N.D. Ind. 
Jan. 25, 2019) (same).  
182. “Q”-Lungian Enters., 272 F. Supp. 3d at 296. 
183. See Free Speech Coal. v. Att’y Gen. U.S. (FSC III), 825 F.3d 149, 158 
(3d Cir. 2016) (holding § 2257 unconstitutional in light of Reed). 
184. See 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2012). 
185. FSC III, 825 F.3d at 154 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2012)). 
186. Id. at 155. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 75.2 (2019) (detailing the Department 
of Justice’s recordkeeping requirements for producers of sexually explicit 
material). 
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The Free Speech Coalition and others challenged the law on First 
Amendment grounds.187 A key aspect of the litigation concerned whe–
ther 18 U.S.C. § 2257 and its accompanying regulations were content-
neutral or content-based.188 The Third Circuit initially determined that 
the laws were content-neutral.189 The case returned to the Third Circuit 
a second time and the appeals court affirmed the law’s constitutionality 
under intermediate scrutiny.190 
The law’s third time before the Third Circuit was the charm, as the 
Supreme Court had decided Reed in the meantime.191 This time, the 
Third Circuit reasoned that the law was clearly content-based, because 
it applied only to expressive material that contained sexually explicit 
content.192 The government argued that the secondary-effects doctrine 
should apply and, thus, intermediate scrutiny should apply.193 The 
Third Circuit rejected the government’s proposed expansion of the 
secondary-effects doctrine beyond brick-and-mortar adult entertain–
ment zoning cases.194 Interestingly, the Third Circuit questioned whe–
ther the secondary-effects doctrine should survive Reed.195 
So far, most courts have allowed the secondary-effects doctrine and 
Reed to co-exist.196 This has led some commentators to predict that the 
troubled doctrine likely will continue its unsteady stay in First 
Amendment jurisprudence.197 
187. Free Speech Coal. v. Att’y Gen. U.S. (FSC I), 677 F.3d 519, 528 (3d Cir. 
2012).  
188. Id. at 533.  
189. Id. 
190. Free Speech Coal. v. Att’y Gen. U.S. (FSC II), 787 F.3d 142, 146–47 (3d 
Cir. 2015). 
191. See FSC III, 825 F.3d at 153.  
192. Id. at 160. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 161–63. 
195. See id. at 161. 
196. See, e.g., Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Schs. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d 
173, 191–93 (D. Mass. 2016); CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of 
Berkeley, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The Supreme 
Court has clearly made a distinction between commercial speech and 
noncommercial speech and nothing in its recent decisions, including Reed, 
even comes close to suggesting that that well-established distinction is no 
longer valid.”). 
197. Jacobs, supra note 5, at 635. 
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Conclusion 
Reed v. Town of Gilbert was a significant free-speech decision. It 
emphasized the importance of the content-discrimination principle by 
focusing first on the statute’s facial language before inquiring into its 
purpose. Reed’s impact has been noticeable in many cases involving 
noncommercial speech, particularly those dealing with panhandling 
political speech. 
Reed’s impact has been minimized, however, as courts have 
continued to follow two longstanding doctrines in First Amendment 
law: the commercial-speech and the secondary-effects doctrine.198 This 
is disturbing because both doctrines are aberrations from pure First 
Amendment principles. Both doctrines warrant abject content-disc–
rimination, preventing speech from entering the marketplace of ideas. 
Hopefully, in the near future the Court will re-examine both doctrines 
to determine whether they comply with fundamental First Amendment 
principles and the content-discrimination principle of Reed. 
198. Kyle Langvardt, A Model of First Amendment Decision-Making at a 
Divided Court, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 833, 851 (2017) (“Reed’s hard line is 
almost certainly too extreme to hold, and there is evidence even now that 
the lower courts are already at pains to minimize its practical effects.”). 
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